In early 2026, Saudi Arabia took the rare step of publicly accusing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of actions that undermine its national security, marking one of the most direct confrontations between the two Gulf powers in recent years. Once close allies, particularly during the Yemen war, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi now appear to be sliding into an open and sustained rivalry with far-reaching implications for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
Saudi Arabia’s increasingly assertive posture visible in Yemen and across broader regional theatres signals a decisive break from the period in which the UAE exercised near-uncontested influence over political outcomes in the Horn of Africa. While Abu Dhabi remains a powerful actor, bolstered by close ties with Israel, deep engagement with Ethiopia’s federal government, and interventions in Sudan and Somaliland, it can no longer operate with the same level of unilateral confidence.
A counter-alignment to Emirati influence is taking shape. Reports indicate growing intelligence and security coordination among Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, and Pakistan. Egypt, in particular, is said to have shared critical intelligence with Riyadh and played an active role in Saudi operations against the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. This emerging bloc elevates Saudi Arabia into the center of a consolidated regional power axis with influence extending beyond the Gulf.
For the Horn of Africa, this shift introduces a new deterrent dynamic. UAE-aligned actors are now forced to recalibrate strategies that once relied on Emirati backing alone. One immediate consequence is the reduced likelihood at least in the medium term of escalation between Ethiopia and Eritrea over contested issues such as Red Sea access. This pause, however, does not reflect a resolution of the underlying disputes between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Isaias Afwerki. Instead, it is the result of external geopolitical counterbalancing that constrains risk-taking on all sides.
The temporary easing of Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions creates an unexpected opening for Tigray, which has been mired in political fragmentation and elite rivalry. The assumption of an imminent Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict had fueled urgency, fear, and premature political alignments among Tigrayan elites, deepening internal divisions. The current geopolitical stasis reduces that pressure and offers a narrow but critical window for reassessment.
Tigray’s central challenge remains elite fragmentation and the absence of cohesive strategic leadership. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), while still influential, no longer possesses the legitimacy or capacity to exercise exclusive leadership. For Tigray to stabilize and safeguard its long-term interests, the TPLF would need to facilitate a broad-based, inclusive political platform that institutionalizes collective leadership rather than perpetuating factional dominance.
Crucially, Tigrayan actors must avoid misreading the Saudi-UAE rivalry as an opportunity to deepen reliance on Eritrea. A prolonged lull in Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions could ease Asmara’s strategic burdens, potentially weakening any incentive to support Tigrayan interests. Rather than external alignment, the moment calls for inward consolidation.
At the same time, risks remain. A stalled external conflict could prompt Addis Ababa to redirect its security apparatus toward internal dissent, including in Tigray. Without unity and strategic coordination, Tigray could face renewed coercive pressure.
In this evolving regional landscape, Tigray’s most viable path forward lies in rapid political consolidation, the creation of legitimate collective leadership, and constructive engagement with Ethiopia. The Saudi-UAE rivalry may not resolve the Horn of Africa’s deep-seated conflicts, but it has reshaped the balance of power creating a brief, fragile opportunity that Tigray can ill afford to waste.
Source: AllAfrica